State v. Peterson Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 35441 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-13-2009
State v. Peterson Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
35441
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Peterson Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 35441" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2150.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2150
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 












REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
FILED~ COPY 
OCT I 3 2000 
j SIIJ)llffle IJII -Court ot 
EmeredonATSby:_ -
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth 
Judicial District of the State ofidaho 
In and For the County of Bannock 




NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Lawrence Wasden 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Nicole L. Schafer 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
(208) 334-2400 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
II. Argument in Reply .......................................................... 1 
A. The Court Had Jurisdiction to Consider the Rule 35 Motion to Correct an Illegal 
Sentence ..................................................................... 1 
B. The Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea Was Timely Because it Was Made Prior to 
Resentencing ................................................................. 3 
C. The Court Had Jurisdiction for Resentencing Proceedings and Thus Deprived Mr. 
Peterson of the Assistance of Counsel When It Elicited a Pro Se "Motion" to Disqualify Judge 
McDermott from Resentencing and Then Granted the Motion ........................... 4 
D. The Comi Had Jurisdiction to Consider the Motion to Disqualify Judge Harding and 
the Motion to Reconsider ........................................................ 4 
E. The Court's Unjustified Increase of the Sentence Should be Vacated Because it is 
Presumptively Vindictive and Violates Due Process ................................... 5 
III. Conclusion ................................................................ 7 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) ........................................................................................... 4 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), rev'd in part, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 
794 (1989) ..................................................................................................................... 5, 7 
STATE CASES 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006) ................................................................. 1 
Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 874 P.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1994) ............................................... 4 
State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct. App. 2008) .............................................. 1 
State v. Clark, 136 Idaho 529, 37 P.3d 26 (Ct.App. 2001) ........................................................... 5 
State v. Clements, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2008 WL. 2207576 (Ct. App. 2008) ......................... 2 
State v. Haggard, 146 Idaho 37, 190 P.3d 193 (Ct. App. 2008) ................................................... 2 
State v. Janoski, 139 Idaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003) .................................................................... 3 
State v. Vetch, 101 Idaho 595,618 P.2d 773 (1980) ..................................................................... 2 
State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct.App. 1994) ....................................................... 4 
11 
II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
As predicted in the Opening Brief, the state argues that the original sentence was not an 
illegal sentence for purposes of Rule 35 and therefore the district court did not have jurisdiction 
to set aside the sentence. From this it argues that the Rule 33 motion to withdraw the guilty plea 
was untimely. As explained below, the court did have jurisdiction over both motions. Moreover, 
it should be presumed that the district court was acting vindictively when it imposed a harsher 
sentence upon resentencing 
A. The Court Had Jurisdiction to Consider the Rule 35 Motion to Correct an Illegal 
Sentence. 
The state first argues that a sentence imposed in violation of Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 
558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), is not an illegal sentence, but merely a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner. From this it concludes that the district court had no jurisdiction to rule on the motion to 
con-ect an illegal sentence. But really the state's argument is only that the district court was 
wrong in granting the motion. As noted in the opening brief, the state cannot make that argument 
now because it did not file a cross appeal. See State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 377, 195 P.3d 
731, 736 (Ct. App. 2008) (The state may not seek affirmative relief on appeal in the absence of a 
timely filed notice of cross-appeal.) 
The state, in response to the above, now attempts to cast the issue in jurisdictional terms 
in order to avoid that problem. Its argument is without merit becanse it confuses the question of 
jurisdiction, i.e., whether the court has the power to decide the motion, with the question of 
whether the motion was meritorious. Putting aside the question of whether the district court was 
con-ect in granting the motion, it is beyond peradventure that it had the authority to decide the 
motion. "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time[.]" ICR 35. Therefore, the filing 
of a motion for the correction of an illegal sentence in a criminal case confers jurisdiction to 
decide the motion upon the district court. 
The existence of jurisdiction upon a timely motion is illustrated in State v. Vetch, 101 
Idaho 595,618 P.2d 773 (1980). There, the defendant claimed that the sentence was illegal 
because he had been charged, convicted and sentenced for a more severe crime than an 
accomplice in violation of the equal protection clause. (This is a claim of an illegally imposed 
sentence.) The motion was denied and the Supreme Court considered the case. First, it stated 
that "[ u ]nder Rule 35, a motion for correction or reduction of sentence based upon imposition of 
an illegal sentence is not subject to the 120 day time constraint." Thus, it did not matter "that the 
motion was filed long after the 120 day period provided for in Rule 35." 101 Idaho at 595-6, 618 
P.2d at 773-74. After finding that the motion was timely, the Court then considered the merits of 
the argument and concluded that the sentence was not illegal. Id. ("The fact that the defendant 
was charged and convicted for a more serious crime and received a greater sentence than his 
accomplice does not make the sentence illegal.") The Court did not find that the district comi 
lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion and affirm the district court's denial of the motion upon 
that basis. Rather, the Court implicitly held that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the 
motion whether the sentence was illegal or not and then proceeding to find the sentence was 
legal. See also State v. Haggard, 146 Idaho 37, 41, 190 P.3d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The 
district comi did not abuse its discretion by denying Haggard's Rule 35 motion for correction of 
an illegal sentence, as the sentence was not illegal."). But see contra State v. Clements, - Idaho 
-, - P.3d -, 2008 WL 2207576 (Ct. App. 2008) review granted (Sept. 23, 2008). In sum, it 
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is self-evident that the jurisdiction of the court to decide a motion for correction of an illegal 
sentence does not depend on whether the sentence is in fact illegal. (If that general proposition 
were true, the court would not have jurisdiction to decide probation violation charges, for 
example, unless there was an actual violation and the court would not have the jurisdiction to 
conduct a preliminary hearing in a criminal case unless there was probable cause to charge the 
defendant. These are obviously absurd results.) 
B. The Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea Was Timely Because it Was Made Prior to 
Resentencing. 
The district court granted Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 motion on March 31, 2008. This order 
vacated the sentence. Limited CR p. 44. On April 23, 2008, an Amended Motion to Withdraw 
Plea was filed. Limited CR p. 52. As the sentencing was not until May 15, 2008, the motion 
was timely under I.C.R. 33, which provides that "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be 
made ... before sentence is imposed[.]" Here, as the court vacated the previous sentence, the 
motion was made prior to sentencing. 
State v. Janoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003), is not apposite. In that 
case the defendant was sentenced in 1994, but did not file his motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
until 2003, which was five years after his appeal was final. Here, Mr. Peterson filed his 
Amended Motion three weeks before he was to be resentenced. (The state cites to no authority 
and makes no argument as to why a resentencing should not be treated the same as an original 
sentencing for purposes of determining timeliness under Rule 33.) 
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C. The Court Had Jurisdiction for Resentencing Proceedings and Thus Deprived Mr. 
Peterson of the Assistance of Counsel When It Elicited a Pro Se "Motion" to Disqualify Judge 
McDermott from Resentencing and Then Granted the Motion. 
As argued above, the court had jurisdiction to consider the motion to correct an illegal 
sentence. Once the court granted that motion, it follows perforce that it continued to have 
jurisdiction over all matters related to the resentencing. 
Next, the state's argument that Mr. Petersou did not have a constitutional right to an 
attorney at the Rule 35 motion misses the mark. Even if it were true that a Rule 35 motion upon 
which a hearing has been granted is not a critical stage for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, 
Judge McDermott had already granted the Rule 35 motion and had moved to an issue related to 
the resentencing, i.e., the question of who was going to preside over the resentencing. There can 
be no doubt that there is a right to counsel at sentencing proceedings. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 
128, 134 (1967) ("[A]ppointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a 
criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.") ( emphasis 
added); Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 796, 874 P.2d 603,607 (Ct. App. 1994). (Further, 
State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct.App. 1994), cited by the state for the proposition 
that a Rule 35 motion is not a critical stage, is distinguishable because there was no hearing 
granted in that case.) 
D. The Court Had Jurisdiction to Consider the Motion to Disqualify Judge Harding 
and the Motion to Reconsider. 
As argued above, the court had jurisdiction to consider the motion to correct an illegal 
sentence. Therefore, it had jurisdiction over the resentencing and the motion to disqualify Judge 
Harding from presiding over the resentencing. 
4 
E. The Court's Unjustified Increase of the Sentence Should be Vacated Because it is 
Presumptively Vindictive and Violates Due Process. 
Finally, the state argues that the increased sentence imposed by Judge Harding should not 
be presumed to be vindictive nuder North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (I 969), rev 'din 
part, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Rather, it contends that the sentence increase is 
justified by Mr. Peterson's assertion of his right to remain silent during the second presentence 
investigation report and the absence of a psychosexual evaluation. These facts, the argument 
goes, make this case like State v. Clark, 136 Idaho 529, 37 P.3d 26 (Ct.App. 2001), where the 
presumption of vindictiveness was overcome. That is not the case, however, because in Clark, 
the district court remarked that the "regression in Clark's assumption of responsibility and his 
generally disdainful attitude at the resentencing hearing indicate an even lesser likelihood of 
rehabilitation and a greater risk to society ifhe were ever released-than was apparent at the 
original sentencing hearing." 136 Idaho at 533, 37 P.3d at 30. Here, Mr. Peterson did not exhibit 
a disdainful attitude at sentencing. Further Mr. Peterson did not regress in his acceptance of 
responsibility, he merely asserted his right to remain silent at the presentence interview. PSI 
(5/7/2008), p. 3. At the sentencing hearing, however, he fully admitted the offense conduct, 
although he disagreed whether the conduct violated the law as written. 
To accept responsibility, yes, I have been involved with this stuff over many, 
many years. Unfortunately. And unfortunately, most of it has been socially 
acceptable in a certain fringe, from Mainstream Magazines to some stuff on the 
internet. That has certainly desensitized me. I am quite sure it has certainly 
desensitized me towards other people. That, coupled with some ofmy 
upbringing. There are various issues. 
I don't seek to avoid responsibility at all. I am a grown man. I have had to come 
to grips with that. I can't blame my parents. I can't blame my siblings. I can't 
blame you. I can't blame anybody. I got myself into this situation. Now I have 
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pied guilty because of how it was explained to me, the law. I disagree now on the 
situation of the law. On the meaning of the law. I disagree that I violated the law 
in a legal sense aud I will maintain that disagreement. However, at this point in 
time, you have adjudicated that I don't have the opportunity to revisit that. So be 
it. 
However, back to the pornography issue. I caused these things to be in the 
process ofdownloading onto my computer. I don't deny that. For my own 
pleasure, as a matter of fact. I have to admit that as well. As I said, there are no 
secrets anymore. 
How do I feel about my crime? I think I have covered that. I feel very poorly abut 
it. It tears me up. I have five children. I have four children that are pretty young. 
I have a daughter who just turned 15. It would tear me up if she were involved 
with that. 
I feel sorry, extreme remorse, ifI have had any part ofhanning any children 
indirectly. I have never hanned one directly. IfI have been a participant in their 
harm indirectly, I am very, very remorseful for that. I beg the court to believe 
that. 
Tr. (May 15, 2008), p. 49, I. 5 -21; p. 50, I. 18- p. 51, I. 22 
Thus, there was no material difference between this statement at resentencing and the 
"Defendaut's Version" of events in the original PSI. PSI (11/26/2006), p. 3-4. Thus, the state's 
argument that Mr. Peterson failed "to give details of his offenses or accept responsibility at the 
time his presentence evaluation was prepared" is not gennane because Mr. Peterson did both at 
sentencing. 
Finally, the record shows that the absence of a psychosexual evaluation was not the cause 
of the greater sentence. It does not appear that Judge Harding considered the absence of a report 
in setting the sentence. See Tr. (May 15, 2008) p. 54-56. Instead, Judge Harding focused on 
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what he saw as a lack ofremorse. Tr. (May 15, 2008), p. 56, l. 23-24. Thus, there is no evidence 
that the lack of a presentence report made any difference in the sentence. Therefore, the Pearce 
presumption of vindictiveness should still be applied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Peterson asks that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas and remand for a trial. Alternatively, the court should vacate the 
sentences due to the errors regarding the disqualification of the judges and remand for further 
proceedings. As a second alternative, this Court should reinstate Judge McDermott's original 
sentences. 




Attorney for Robert Peterson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this t!2ay of October, 2009, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy Attorney General, P.O. 
Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010. 
~~(1\~C~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
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